



Allmode

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SERVICES

Global Security and Intelligence Report

February 2015

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COMMERCIAL - IN - CONFIDENCE

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Intelligence & Reporting



Intelligence is more than information and news gathering. It is the process by which information is collated, verified, analysed and used to respond effectively to time critical information. Current, historical and credible intelligence not only tells you what the risks but projects possible hot spots of criminal activity. At Allmode we do not outsource intelligence but gain real time situational awareness and speed of reporting by continually developing our product, and getting the time critical information out to our teams and clients. Our services include:


- Spot reports
- Advisory reports
- Global security reports
- Specific area and region reports
- Passage threat and risk reports
- Venue and event specific reports

Piracy Update –

JWC HIGH RISK AREA (HRA)

The JWC High Risk Area (**HRA**) is defined by the following boundaries:


- On the North-West, by the Red Sea, south of Latitude 15°00 N
- On the West of the Gulf of Oman by Longitude 58°00 E
- On the East, Longitude 78°00E
- On the South, Latitude 12°00 S



Summary of Piracy incidents –

1. **04/02/15** – (Position: 13°30'N - 049°54'E, IRTC, Gulf of Aden.) Attempted. A Master reported being approached by one boat with ten persons on-board, which came to within 3nm at a speed of 7knots. The boat was towing four white skiffs. One boat then moved towards the vessel to within 1nm and stopped. No weapons or ladders were spotted. Another boat was spotted on the port bow, towing a blue skiff. This was accompanied by a white skiff with 2 people on-board. This white skiff crossed the vessels bow at a speed of 25 knots and closed

- to within 1nm on the starboard side. The armed security team showed their weapons and the skiffs returned to the mothership. The vessel is safe.
2. **10/02/15** – (Position: 02°04'S - 050°43'E, off Somalia, HRA) Suspicious Approach. A Master on an MV reported seeing a suspicious vessel 30/35 metre long, blue hull with white structures and a crane) on the radar at 26nm. At 11nm, the suspicious vessel altered course to close in on the vessel to 1.6nm. As a result, the MV altered course to open the distance, but the suspicious vessel made a similar adjustment. When the suspicious vessel was at 3nm from the MV, a small boat was launched and this proceeded towards the MV. The security team on-board the MV fired a parachute flare towards the boat, which then returned to the suspicious vessel. The suspicious vessel then changed course away from the MV. The vessel is safe and no weapons or ladders were sighted.
 3. **17/02/15** – (Position: 14°51'N - 052°20'E, Gulf of Aden) Suspicious Approach. An MV reported seeing a suspicious vessel with a black hull approaching at high speed on the port side to within two cables. The vessel carried out evasive manoeuvres and the armed security team fired rocket flares. The suspicious vessel then slowed down and changed direction. Ten minutes later, four more suspicious vessels with white hulls approached on the port and starboard sides, at a distance of five cables. The MV again carried out evasive manoeuvres until the distance increased and the suspicious vessels moved away. No weapons or ladders were sighted. The MV is safe.
 4. **21/02/15** – (Position: 20°27'N - 059°06'E, Oman) Suspicious Approach. A Merchant Vessel was approached at speed by three white-hulled skiffs containing x 4 POB. A brown mother vessel was also sighted covered by canvas at a distance of 2.5nm. One skiff approached the MV at speed to a distance of 1.1 cables on the port quarter. The MV took evasive measures and the Armed Security Team showed their weapons and then the lead skiff slowed before ceasing their approach. No ladders or weapons were sighted.
 5. **21/02/15** – (Position: 11°53'N - 043° 41'E, Gulf of Aden) Suspicious Approach. A yacht sighted two dhows with x 4 POB on each at 1nm astern from their vessel. The people on the dhows were trying to get the vessel's attention, shouting something was wrong with their main engine. The master indicated that he couldn't help them. Both dhows started to move, whereupon the master then increased his ships speed. After 20 minutes of following the vessel, the dhows stopped in the water. No ladders or weapons were sighted.
 6. **21/02/15** – (Position: 13°03'N - 043°06'E, Gulf of Aden) Suspicious Approach. In conditions of reduced visibility (2nm), a MV reported two white skiffs with x 5 POB in each skiff, wearing yellow rain-coats, on the port side at 300m. The skiffs came towards the vessel at speed, AST on board fired x 5 warning shots. Immediately the skiffs turned away into the mist, then reappeared on the starboard side at a distance of 2nm 30 minutes later. Both skiffs then moved to the front of the vessel and continued outbound. Possible sighting of ladders on one skiff, but unable to confirm due to poor visibility.
 7. **27/02/15** – (Position: 12°52'N - 043°11'E, Gulf of Aden) Suspicious Approach. The Master reports being approached by two white-hulled skiffs containing x 2 POB and x 3 POB wearing yellow rain-coats. Initially both skiffs were parallel to the vessel on their starboard side at a distance of 2nm. One skiff closed the vessel's starboard bow at speeds of 15kts to within 0.5nm. The AST showed their weapons, the alarm was sounded. However, the skiffs followed for 5 minutes and then discontinued their approach. No weapons or ladders were sighted.



As the NE Monsoon abates, conditions in the Indian Ocean will become more favourable for small craft operation and therefore the number of incidents historically increases from now until May, when the summer monsoon will commence. However, regardless of the monsoon seasons, soft approaches, whereby a small craft will show signs of approaching a vessel, to ascertain the level of security on-board, have continued to occur. This is demonstrated by the three suspicious approaches made in one day towards the end of February.

Smaller vessels such as Yachts transiting this region are particularly at risk, due to their low freeboard and are a valuable target. The incident on the 21st February involving a yacht demonstrated a tactic commonly used by pirates whereby an attempt is made for a vessel to approach and then an attack is launched. Allmode would not advise any yacht to transit through the HRA without armed security on-board.

The sheltered waters of the Bab el Mandeb is a prime location where the weather conditions can be different to elsewhere in the region. Protected by nearby landmass, soft approaches can be seen within this region all year round and vessels cannot afford to become complacent simply because the weather patterns appear less-favourable.

Bearing in mind that the coalition forces of Nato have been scaled down, from five vessels to two, it is now even more important that vessels have their own well established security systems and procedures in place.

A report surfaced this month stating that a Kuwaiti tanker had been attacked by pirates as it was en route to Djibouti. The vessel has not been named, but belonged to the Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Co. The report stated that the tanker was approached by four boats each carrying armed men, but the vessel was able to reach Djibouti without incident. We are currently unable to verify this report however if this is the case, it is a stark reminder of the risks involved in transiting this region.

The slow rate of prosecution of pirates continues however in February Spain managed to secure a conviction for six Somali pirates accused of attacking the tuna vessel 'Izurdia', back in 2012. The pirates each received a sentence of sixteen years in jail.

Efforts are being stepped up to improve the piracy monitoring services in the HRA, with the establishment of a new Regional Maritime Information Centre, funded by the EU and initiated by the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). This centre is to be located in Madagascar, rather than the Seychelles, as the Seychelles already hosts an IOC Anti-Piracy Unit and the Regional Maritime Crime Information Centre.

Another death of a ship security officer has been recorded in the Seychelles at Port Victoria. The Estonian security personnel was found in the water after falling from the ship. He was declared dead some time later and the cause of death was drowning. This is the second incident involving the death of a security officer in the Seychelles. An investigation is now underway regarding the circumstances surrounding his death.

WEST AFRICA




Summary of incidents –

- 1. 01/02/15** – (Position: 05°28'N - 005°05'E, around 10nm SW of Escravos Offshore, Nigeria)
Attempted. On the forecandle of an anchored tanker, two crew members noticed a boat approaching at high speed. As the boat closed in, the crew noticed something being thrown towards the vessel. The boat moved away and waited. After a while, the boat slowly approached the vessel again. The crew noticed the persons in the boat light an object and throw it towards the vessel, which hit the ship's rail and fell into the water. A loud explosion was heard. The boat moved away. The Nigerian Navy and the Port Authority was informed. A gun boat was deployed and the vessel moved to a secure anchorage.
- 2. 03/02/15** – (Position: southern Ijaw, Nigeria.) Boarding. Gunmen operating from a speedboat, kidnapped four Nigerian employees of the Agip Oil Company. The incident occurred in Southern Ijaw, when the workers were travelling on a boat from Amassomma to Ogoimbir.

The four abducted Agip workers were taken to an unknown location in the creeks.

3. **03/02/15** – (Position: Qua Iboe Terminal, Nigeria). Boarding. Approximately a dozen men boarded a super tanker MT Kalamos. In the attack, one crew member was killed and three others were kidnapped. It was later reported that the three hostages, one Pakistani and two Greeks, had been released on the 25th February save and well.
4. **05/02/15** – (Position: Berth 5 & 6 ENL Jetty, Lagos Harbours, Nigeria.) Attempted. The Duty AB on-board a berthed Chemical Tanker spotted a robber attempting to board the vessel. He alerted the on-board security team, who chased the robbers away. After a while, the robbers attempted to return and the security team fired one warning shot resulting in the robbers aborting the approach.
5. **25/02/15** – **Incident Update** - A report on the 25th February states that pirates have released the three crewmembers from the Greece-flagged large crude carrier KALAMOS. They had been taken hostage on 3rd February near the Qua Iboe oil terminal, Nigeria. During the hostage taking incident, pirates killed one of the 27 crewmembers, before departing with two Greeks and one Pakistani hostage. No details of the operations involved in securing the freedom of the captives will be released by the company, which argues that this might encourage further attacks. (Lloyd's List)



Three major incidents have occurred this month highlighting the growing concern for the shipping industry operating within the Gulf of Guinea. The region has now gained the reputation as 'kidnap alley' and the nature of the attacks has caused many to question whether it makes commercial sense to be operating in a region with such a dangerous reputation and one which sees little sign of improving due to the inability of shipping companies being able to take their own precautions regarding security, in the form of armed guards. The dangers faced by the shipping industry were intensified during February as a deputy captain was shot dead during a hijacking incident off Togo.

2014 saw a rise in the number of crew members taken hostage in the Gulf of Guinea; 442 in 2014 compared to 304 in 2013. Due to the worrying nature of these attacks; which are violent and aggressive it is natural for shipping companies to want to take further action to help safeguard their vessel and crew and as a result BIMCO have issued a security Advisory regarding the use of PMSC's:

Date issued: 5/02/15

- 1. As reported yesterday by BIMCO Security the Nigerian Government has said that it will not hesitate to detain any ship entering the country's territorial and coastal waters with security escorts on board, whether armed or unarmed. The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, NIMASA, gave this warning when the agency detained three ships, LILAC VICTORIA, UACC EAGLE and MORGANE, because they sailed into Nigeria with individuals linked to private security firms overseas offering training on the use of weapons.*
- 2. Members are advised to note this intention which has been corroborated by other third party sources. Yesterday afternoon two PMSC Guards were arrested and a ship detained although cargo operations have been allowed to continue. It is not yet known if the guards were armed or not.*

*Members are reminded that detailed BIMCO Guidance on Gulf of Guinea Piracy can be found in "Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for Protection against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Region". The principles and best practices outlined are in many areas identical to dealing with SOMALI piracy and are strongly recommended. It is strongly advised if trading Nigeria members seek assistance from NIMASA or the Nigerian Navy, the only legitimate sources of protection.
Contact: security@bimco.org*


The hijacking of a fishing vessel in February could be an indication that the operating pirate action groups (PAG's) want to use it for launching more attacks out at sea and therefore all vessels are to remain extra vigilant and treat fishing vessels not engaged in the process of fishing as suspicious. Reporting suspicious activity early could avert an attack

Tension is building in Nigeria, due to the postponement of the Presidential elections and the authorities are becoming extremely cautious and pro-active over any vessel carrying arms in the region, regardless of the purpose. Any vessel found with arms onboard will face severe consequences. The authorities fear that there is at present a growing market for additional arms in the run up to the elections.

In mid- February, the terrorist group Boko Haram, led by Abubakar Shekau, have released their first message via twitter (17/02/15) vowing to disrupt the upcoming general elections in Nigeria. Although the group is very active in the northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, they are showing signs of spreading down towards the capital and even as far south as Lagos.


On a more positive note, at the end of February, the two Greek and one Pakistani crew members who were taken hostage at the beginning of February, have been freed. No information on how they were freed was forthcoming from the company, who do not want to encourage any further hostage taking in the region.

BAY OF BENGAL



Summary of incidents –


1. **15/02/15** – (Position: 50km south of Sonar Char, Bangladesh) Attacked. Pirates attacked up to seven fishing boats while they were operating about 50 km south from Sonar Char area. The pirates attacked three fishing boats, initially and then four other boats came to the aid of the fishing boats and were then also attacked. It is believed that at least 8 fishermen suffered gunshot-related injuries during the attack. The pirates were able to steal fish, fuel, money and mobile phones from the fishermen. The injured have been taken to a regional medical facility for treatment. (www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com; www.thedailystar.net).



Attacks on fishing boats are common within this region, as pirate gangs run extortion rackets and expect the local fishermen to pay for protection. They then take a cut of the catch and profits. This is

increasing in the region and fishermen are starting to fight back in an attempt to try and protect the little that they make. However, as shown, this can have fatal consequences. The local authorities are doing very little to break these criminal gangs and the fishermen and their families will face an uphill struggle to break away from, what has become, the norm in the region.

SOUTH EAST ASIA




Summary of incidents –

1. **22/01/15** – (Position: 05°50'S - 106°55'E, Jakarta anchorage, Indonesia). Boarding. The Duty oiler, during routine rounds on-board an anchored ship, noticed four robbers in the engine room. One of the robbers took the crew member hostage and threatened him with a knife. The remaining robbers stole engine spares and escaped. The alarm was raised and all the crew were mustered. The Port Authority was informed.
2. **28/01/15** – (Position: Approx. Lembeh Island, North Sulawesi, Indonesia.) Hijacked. Eight pirates on a fast boat boarded and hijacked a tanker whilst underway. All the crew were set adrift in a life raft and later saved by a local fisherman. The tanker is still missing.
3. **31/01/15** – (Position: 03°55'N - 098°46'E, Belawan Anchorages, Indonesia.) Boarded. The Duty AB on routine rounds, on-board an anchored Bulk Carrier, noticed a child on the forecastle deck. He immediately informed the D/O, who raised the alarm and the crew were mustered. Seeing the crew respond, the child jumped overboard and swam to a nearby boat in which the AB noticed two other persons. On investigating, it was noticed that the child had accessed the forecastle deck by climbing the anchor chain and crawling through the hawse

- pipe cover opening. Nothing had been stolen.
4. **31/01/15** – (Position: 01°09'N - 103°27'E, around 2.7 nm ENE of Pulau Karimun Kecil, Indonesia.) Boarding. Five robbers, armed with a shot gun and knives, boarded a Bulk Carrier underway and entered the engine room. The Chief Engineer noticed the robbers and informed the bridge. The alarm was raised and the crew mustered. The incident was then reported to the local authorities. Upon investigating, it was revealed that ship's engine spares had been stolen. Upon arriving at the Eastern Boarding Ground, the Singaporean Authorities boarded the vessel to carry out their own investigation.
 5. **04/02/15** – (Position: 10°12'N - 107°03'E, around 7nm South of Vungtau, Vietnam.) Boarded. Five robbers boarded an anchored container ship. The crew spotted the robbers and raised the alarm. Seeing the crew respond, the robbers escaped with ship's stores.
 6. **12/02/15** – (Position: 03°41'S - 114°28'E, Taboneo anchorage, Indonesia) Boarding. Two robbers boarded an anchored Bulk Carrier; around 11nm from the entrance of Banjarmasin; using a rope with a hook on the end. The duty crew spotted the robbers and informed the bridge. The alarm was raised and the crew mustered. Seeing the crew respond, the robbers escaped in their boat. Upon investigation, it was found that two padlocks were broken, but nothing had been stolen.
 7. **12/02/15** – (Position: 20°41'N - 107°12'E, Hongai Outer Anchorage, Vietnam) Boarding. Five robbers, armed with knives, boarded an anchored Bulk Carrier. The OOW noticed some movements on the forecastle and instructed the duty AB to check. As the AB proceeded forward, the OOW directed the Aldis lamp towards the robbers, who escaped in their boat. Upon investigation, it was found that ship's stores and property had been stolen.
 8. **13/02/15** – (Position: 03°11'N - 100°43'E, Malacca Straits) Hijacking. On the 12/02/15, a Thai registered Product Tanker, MT Lapin, with 15 crew onboard, departed Singapore with approximately 2,000 tons of bunker oil. On the 13/02/15, at approximately 1955 LT, six to eight armed pirates boarded the MT Lapin in position 03°11'N - 100°43'E. The pirates took control of the vessel and crew and proceeded to be joined by an unknown vessel, to which they off loaded five tons of diesel and the 2,000 tons of bunker oil. At 0400 LT, 14/02/15 the vessel was moved to 03°23.94'N - 100°22.71'E, where the pirates anchored the vessel and destroyed the communication equipment and stole ship's stores and crew belongings. Before making their escape, they tied up the crew and informed them that they had left an explosive device on-board and that if they tried to escape before the pirates, that the device would detonate. At approximately 0700 LT on the 14/02/15 the crew managed to free themselves and sail the vessel towards Thai waters. The vessel reached Thai waters on the 15/02/15 and anchored approximately 14.34nm west of Ko Tarutao at which point the crew were able to activate the Ship Security Alarm System. The Master was also able to contact the shipping company, with the help of a passing fishing vessel. The Royal Thai Navy were informed, through the ReCAAP Focal Point (Thailand), who sent assistance to the crew and also an EOD (explosive ordinance disposal) unit to deal with the explosive device, which turned out to be an electrical circuit with no explosive or detonator attached. All crew are safe and unharmed.
 9. **14/02/15** – (Position: Berth 107, Belawan Anchorage, Indonesia) Boarding. Ten robbers, armed with knives, boarded a berthed Bulk Carrier. The alarm was raised and the crew mustered. The Local authorities boarded the vessel. Seeing the authorities, the robbers escaped with the ship's property.
 10. **14/02/15** – (Position: 20°36'N - 106°51'E, Haiphong OPL anchorage, Vietnam.) Boarding. The Duty AB on routine rounds on a Container, noticed five robbers on the forecastle deck. He immediately informed OOW, who raised the alarm and the crew were mustered. Upon hearing the alarm and seeing the crew respond, the robbers escaped in their wooden motor boat. Investigation revealed that the paint store door was damaged and ship's stores had been stolen. The incident was reported to the Port Control via VHF channel 16.

11. **21/02/15** – (Position: 01°10'N - 103°26'E, around 2 nm NE of Pulau Karimun Kecil, Indonesia) Boarding. The Duty engine crew on-board a Bulk Carrier underway, noticed two robbers in the engine room. He immediately informed the bridge. The alarm was raised and the crew were mustered. Seeing the crew react, the robbers escaped without stealing anything.
12. **20/02/15** – (Position: 02°08'N - 104°39'E, around 18nm SE of Pulau Aur, Malaysia) Hijack. Seven pirates approached a Product Tanker in a small wooden boat, armed with guns and knives. They managed to board the tanker, before hijacked it as it was underway. All the crew were taken hostage. The pirates then transferred some of the cargo to another vessel that had come alongside. They also stole crew properties and ship's cash and escaped on the 21.02.2015. All the crew and the vessel are safe.
13. **23/02/15 – Update on the Hijacking of the MT Rehobot** - On the 28th January 2015, the MT Rehobot was boarded by eight masked men armed with knives. They took control of the vessel off Lembeh Island, Indonesia. The Chemical Tanker was carrying 1,100 tons of diesel. On the 31st January, all 14 Indonesian Crew of the MT Rehobot were found in life rafts drifting near to Lembeh Island, where they were picked up by the Indonesian authorities. The vessel remained missing. On the 1st February, 2015, ReCAAP ISC issued an alert to the shipping industry and the Philippines authority, to be on the look-out for the vessel, which they believed was heading into waters off the Philippines. On the 23rd February at about 2313 hrs the Philippines Coast Guard received information that a ship had run aground in Barangay Cabuaya, Mati City, Davao Oriental, Philippines. The Coast Guard Station Mati, Field Station South Eastern Mindanao and Naval Intelligence Security Group (NISG) proceeded to the location of the grounded ship on 24 Feb at about 0830 LT and later verified that this vessel was the missing MT Rehobot. Initial investigation revealed that there were signs of a spillage of an unknown substance found onboard the ship. Further updates are expected from the Philippines authorities once the investigation is concluded.
14. **25/02/15** – (Position: 01°08'N - 103°28'E, around 3nm E of Pulau Karimun Kecil, Indonesia) Boarding. Three robbers boarded a Bulk Carrier whilst underway. The alarm was raised and the crew mustered. Seeing the crew react, the robbers made their escaped empty handed.



South East Asia has now been rated as the pirate capital of the world. In 2014 the region accounted for 75 percent of all incidents worldwide. This represents a 22 percent increase from the previous year. However, the piracy incidents in SE Asia do not hold as much sway with regards to the world press or the authorities responsible for implementing change in laws and practices. This is mainly due to the fact that the majority of attacks are categorized as petty thefts, usually with little or no violence and with relatively little economic impact on world trade. Only in the last year has attention been given to the rise in the levels of fuel theft, but even this is being downplayed, as it is being suggested that these incidents are 'inside jobs' and have little bearing on the large flow of traffic that transit this vital trade route.

During February, however, an incident involving a mock improvised device grabbed the attention of the media and acted as a stark reminder of what could happen in this area if the authorities were to dismiss these acts as nothing to worry about. It has sparked fears that this incident could encourage other terrorist groups to attempt a similar incident with real explosives which would impact hugely on the trade traffic and subsequently affect the economies of numerous countries.

In recent years, pirates in the region have adapted and changed their Modus Operandi (MO). Nowadays they frequently board vessels whilst in transit, particularly in the choke-point off Pulau Karimunjaya and arm themselves with weapons, usually knives, even if they have no intention of using them. They are can be violent towards crew and seem to be more organized in their approach. It would appear that a complex and organized criminal network has emerged, with buyers set up for the stolen cargo, usually fuel. In February, the authorities in Singapore arrested twelve men in Singapore after they were caught selling stolen marine gas oil to an Equatorial Guinea-flagged vessel whilst at sea. To address this issue, the authorities need to work hand in hand with land based crime prevention teams to seek out those responsible for the arrangements of such transactions.

SOUTH AMERICA



- 1. 01/02/15** – (Position: 15nm offshore from Puerto Cortez, Honduras). Boarding. A Sailing Yacht on route from Bay Islands to Rio Dulce, was boarded by three men armed with a gun, whilst underway. They stole the outboard motor and other valuables from the crew, such as cash and electronic equipment. The crew were unharmed and were then able to proceed to the next port. The incident was reported to the authorities at Livingston. There were four people on board the yacht.
- 2. 02/02/15** – (Position: 03°45'S - 038°35'W, Fortaleza, Brazil) Attempted Boarding. Three knife wielding robbers attempted to board the sailing schooner WINDJAMMER. They tried climbing up to the main deck shouting "pirata' pirata", but the crew was able to fend them off with a stout wooden boat hook. They were very aggressive constantly stabbing at the crew with very large kitchen knives. They eventually gave up trying to board and instead stabbed holes in the inflatable dingy that was still up in the davits. The crew moved to the marina at sunrise and reported the incident to other vessel owners and was told that a French yacht anchored out of the marina had been robbed of all their electronics and money the night before. (Noonsite).
- 3. 15/02/15** – (Position: 02°30'S - 044°19'W, Sao Luis Yacht Club, NE Brazil).Boarding. Several armed robbers boarded a sailing yacht whilst at the Sao Luis yacht club. During the course of the robbery, the Dutch owner of the yacht was shot in the chest and died on the scene. His wife jumped overboard and escaped. The robbers left the yacht and have not been apprehended. (Noonsite).
- 4. 23/02/15** – (Position: 10°25'N - 075°33'W, Cartagena anchorage, Colombia). Boarding. Two men snuck into the rudder compartment of the anchored MT PRISCO ALEXANDRA near whilst at Cartagena Anchorage. A Colombia Navy boat on patrol in the harbour saw the men and conducted an investigation. They reportedly found 102 kilograms of cocaine that had

been smuggled into the rudder compartment by the men, who were then arrested and the cocaine impounded. (www.vesseltracker.com; www.tradewindsnews.com; gCaptain).

There were two incidents in Brazil this month including the murder of a Dutch yacht owner which reinforces the need for yachts to consider their own security arrangements to protect their vessel, crew and belongings whilst in this location. The violence demonstrated in both incidents is not uncommon in Brazil, where the possession of arms is rife. Life is of no value to many criminals in Brazil, who are so accustomed to violence, that it has become a part of everyday life.

Yachts planning on visiting the Caribbean are advised to stay well away from the Colombian coast, which is the main transit point for drug smuggling out of South America. Smugglers are always looking for different ways and types of vessels where they can hide drugs, to use as a mule and it is the responsibility of the Master to remain educated on the methods used by smugglers, which are becoming more and more elaborate.

Central American countries are also plagued with crime and this is bound to spill over into the maritime sector. Never let your guard down and become complacent in your surroundings. Ensure that your crews are well trained in security practices and procedures and remain vigilant at all times.

REST OF THE WORLD

This month has been dominated by concerns over irregular migrants at sea in the Mediterranean and the risks and responsibilities of those who encounter such groups. Much debate has gone on due to an upsurge in the number of attempts to make the deadly crossing; mostly from the Libyan shores; at a time when there is usually a winter lull.

There has been a decrease in naval patrols, which have been replaced by the EU funded Frontex Operation Triton, has caused concern, as the primary role of Triton is not search and rescue, but information sharing and monitoring. This has placed a greater dependency on merchant shipping to assist in the rescue of migrants at sea and has many implications associated with it. (see Allmode's Best Management Practice booklet on large scale rescue of migrants at sea).

Alongside this, is the threat from the terrorist organisation ISIS, who has posted a threat on social media, to all vessels using the Mediterranean, saying that they will wreak havoc on the Mediterranean by using migrant boats to travel to the Italian shores to infiltrate the western world. They also suggested that their members could be hidden amongst the migrants and these boats could be used to cause harm and disruption to this busy transit route. As a result of these statements Allmode have produced the following advisory for all vessels operating within this region:

Threat from ISIS – special Report

ISIS are, by now, familiar to us, through their many public beheadings and kidnappings of foreign hostages to be used in publicity propaganda. They are without doubt the major concern for all foreign workers present in many of the Arab states and the local population who are struggling to survive daily. They are no longer restricted to their traditional power bases in the cities and towns in Iraq and Syria, but are extending their influence in neighbouring countries such as Egypt and Libya, taking full advantage of the economic and political struggles of both countries.

They have sympathizers and followers throughout Europe, who are either engaged in current campaigns or returning from fighting indoctrinated with a vision of their ideology for the future. (Figures from Europol suggest that 5,000 EU citizens are engaged in fighting in Syria or Iraq or have travelled to these countries and returned home.)

Recent news headlines and comments from military sources, such as the Italian Minister of Defence, have suggested that ISIS have the motive and means to adopt a maritime attack strategy in the Mediterranean Sea, which would have huge implications for the shipping community in general. Parallels can be drawn with the recent experience of piracy off Somalia, which has plagued the shipping community for many years and continues to do so.

But what are the real chances of ISIS carrying out such threats and how can the shipping community prepare for such a situation actually happening?

Geo-political Situation

ISIS have developed training camps in Libya and are active in the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, alongside other jihadist groups who are sympathetic towards or affiliated to them. These groups may not be directly involved in ISIS operations, but rather allow them to operate on their territory. The most prevalent of these groups are the Salafist jihadist group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, who have openly pledged allegiance to Adu Bakr al Baghdadi.

In Libya, the eastern town of Derna has long been governed by a federation of jihadi groups providing a permissive environment in which ISIS can operate. It is likely that they have become more powerful than the established jihadi group Ansar al Sharia. However, they are currently working with other groups, rather than superseding them.

Intelligence sources indicate that ISIS have around 800 fighters in Derna and dozens of training camps on the outskirts of the town, along with larger facilities in the Green Mountains nearby. These facilities are said to be training new recruits from Africa and returning jihadist from Syria and Iraq.

Derna however, is situated between Tobruk (where the Libyan House of Representatives have established their base as the UN recognised government) and Benghazi (where the army of General Khalifa Haftar is attempting to establish control from which to govern the rest of Libya ("Operation Dignity")).

Further west, the city of Tripoli is under the control of the other de-facto government, Libya Dawn, who are a disjointed coalition of former al-Qaeda jihadists, Berber ethnic militias, members of the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and a network of conservative merchants from nearby Misrata. In effect, the country now has a series of warring states, west verses east, with three main groups vying for power; Libya Dawn, Operation Dignity and Jihadist groups. Many see this as two main groups, with the jihadist as the 'spoilers'¹

¹ Jason Pack, Cambridge University

Means And Motive

So, could ISIS really launch a maritime campaign in the Mediterranean to disrupt the shipping community and lure Europe into acting? In theory, yes they could.

Libya has a coastline of around 1,000 miles and ISIS are known to have multiple resources and funds at their disposal. They are well armed and motivated and thrive by engaging in activities that cause worldwide condemnation and possible over-reaction. This gives them power and the image that they are greater in number than they are in reality. By making countries react, they bolster their numbers by showing western aggression as the enemy. Consider the beheading of the 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians. Immediately, Egypt reacted with airstrikes and ISIS with retaliatory car bombings. Now, thousands of Egyptians are fleeing Libya, back to Egypt for fear they may be targeted. This is effectively clearing a path for ISIS to exploit and forcing governments to pick sides.

ISIS claimed this week on social media that they intend to send 500,000² towards Europe in hundreds of boats to cause havoc. Would they have the numbers to do this? Probably not, it is thought that there are anywhere between 1,000 to 3,000 fighters on the ground in Libya, however if they were to use the hundreds of migrants that leave the Libyan coast on almost a daily basis, as their pawns, they could cause enough fear to spark a reaction, or in their hopes, an over-reaction.

Libya is close to the European shores (400 miles from Sicily). As stated by the Italian pro-ISIS blogger Adu Irhim al-Libi, ISIS could reach these shores using small boats. He goes on to suggest that such action could close shipping lanes and that ISIS could target “crusader” ships and tankers. He has written an article entitled, ‘Libya: The Strategic Gateway for the Islamic State.’ However, the reality is that ISIS are not really intent on reaching Europe, as they have their disciples already there, in every major city. They want to be noticed and feared and the best way for them to do this, is to continue parading their captives in orange overalls, for the world to see.³



Figure 1: ISIS Prepares to murder 21 captive Egyptian Christians in Libya (Mediterranean Sea in background)

How might this affect shipping?

The Mediterranean accounts for about 15 percent of global shipping activity (approximately 220,000 ships annually) and approximately 370 million tons of oil are transported per-year by around 600 tankers a day. More than 200 ferries transport about 150,000 passengers daily, not to mention the

² [Le Figaro, “L’État islamique menace d’envoyer 500.000 migrants en Europe depuis la Libye”, \(Feb 2015\)](#)

³ [Abu Arhim al-Libim \(ISIS Supporter\), „Libya: The Strategic Gateway for the Islamic State, translated and published by Winter. C, The Quilliam Foundation, \(Feb 2015\)](#)

thousands of fishing boats that rely on the sea. Many wealthy people from all over Europe use the Mediterranean as their playground, moving from country to country in their superyachts.

Table 1: Potential Courses of Action

Most Likely Course of Action	Most Dangerous Course of action
<p>They may target the wealthy, as possible high value hostages to be paraded in front of the cameras on social media as a means of extorting funds to continue their campaign⁴.</p> <p>More likely, is the taking of hostages for both media attention and economic gains. This would allow ISIS to continue to advance in countries such as Libya. Hostages can be sold and traded amongst jihadi groups, enabling cooperation to continue. Hostages can also be used as human shields to prevent local militia or armies (such as Khalifi Haftar's) from attacking.</p>	<p>ISIS could use migrant boats, which they already use as cash-cows, as human missiles for these tankers and cruise ships.</p> <p>Perhaps an even more high profile option would be either using suicide bombers or planted explosive devices aboard a rescuing vessel. Worse still could be the pirating of a vessel by disguised ISIS operatives once aboard who then use the vessel as weapons, crashing it into a port, into other vessels, detonating it in a strategic location causing significant environmental, commercial disruption not to mention the potential loss of life. Envisage the scenario of a laden VLCC being detonated and sunk in the entrance to Valetta harbour. The potential consequences are unthinkable.</p>

In either eventuality, they pose a significant threat. Both would seem attractive to them, and the fall-out would be a significant impact on EU state business. It would draw significant media attention and strengthen their psychological impact.

However, just because these scenarios are possible, does not mean that they are probable. The taking of many innocent lives in one "spectacular" could be detrimental to retaining the sympathies of their followers, or could bring consequences on a large scale that would effectively prevent them from achieving their goal.

⁴ [Parry, Chris \(Rear Admiral\) in, *The Sunday Times*, "Yachties at risk as Isis takes to the sea" \(Feb 2015\)](#)



Figure 2: An Excerpt from an unofficial ISIS strategy statement and propaganda document, outlining designs on southern Europe and the Mediterranean

Large Scale Migration and ISIS, The link:

The link between ISIS and Large Scale Migration in the Mediterranean⁵ has been explicitly stated⁶. Whether that be by using the ingress of migrants to camouflage their movements into Europe^{7,8,9} hijacking migrant boats¹⁰ or in order to specifically target commercial shipping and yachts¹¹

⁵ Allmode, *Best Management Practices for Large Scale Rescue Operations*, (March 2015)

⁶ [Abu Arhim al-Libim \(ISIS Supporter\), *Libya: The Strategic Gateway for the Islamic State*, translated and published by Winter. C, The Quilliam Foundation, \(Feb 2015\)](#)

⁷ [Stavridis, Jim \(Admiral\) in, *The Sunday Times*, "Yachties at risk as Isis takes to the sea" \(Feb 2015\)](#)


⁸ [The Telegraph, "How Isis spread to Libya - and now has Europe in its sights", \(Feb 2015\)](#)

⁹ [The Times, "Isis uses people trafficking routes to get into Europe" \(March 2015\)](#)

¹⁰ [The Independent, "Isis plans to use immigrant boats from Libya to cause terror in Europe and close shipping routes", \(Feb 2015\)](#)

¹¹ [The Telegraph, "Islamic State 'planning to use Libya as gateway to Europe'", \(Feb 2015\)](#)

Map 1: "Routes and Migrant Heat-map"¹²



Map 2: "ISIS Advances in N Africa"



What precautions could be taken?

Increased information sharing amongst the firstly the European states and then the broader international community must be the key. Particular attention needs to be given to the numerous boats leaving the Libyan coast on a weekly basis. This could be done by developing a more integrated maritime surveillance system whereby timely data is shared amongst states most at risk and on the front line. Admittedly, Frontex have Eurosur, which is an information exchange system

¹² [International Organisation for Migration, "Migrant Deaths on World Borders" \(2015\)](#)

coordinated by National Coordination Centres. However, this is still being developed does not yet have great breadth or depth. Monitoring of the Libyan coast is crucial and any unusual activity should be alerted and information shared within the shipping community.

Training for security related issues should be paramount in the shipping industry for management, senior officers and crews. Security measures should be in place to react to any information received or unfolding situation.

Due to the nature of the terrorist and organised crime (people traffickers) related threat it is vital that shipowners and crews remain vigilant to the threat of political and crime related violence. Terrorists and people traffickers will be armed, violent and unscrupulous, and will not hesitate to use violence to achieve their aims (or as an end in itself)

Specialist training advice and support should be sought, including:

- Training
 - STCW PDS
 - STCW HELM
 - STCW Crowd Management
 - STCW Crisis Management And Human Behaviour
 - Conflict Management
 - Allmode Large Scale Rescue at Sea (LSRS) (Management/Officers/Crew)
 - Allmode Crew-Safe
- Expert advice and crisis management, on-board and ashore, to assist in the planning for, management of and conduct of emergency response in order to mitigate the potential human and financial impact on the vessel/company

Consideration may be given to embarking additional advisors for a transit via the southern Mediterranean. This embedded advisor should be a security specialist with training in dealing with maritime security threats and a high level of medical and first aid training including trauma.

He will be available to provide training and expert advice to the crew, and to assist in the event of any threatening act, conducting international liaison and providing advice to the master, enabling him to make the most informed and logical decision in a high-pressure and rapidly changing environment.



1. North & Central America:

10/02/15 – Jamaica - reports of robberies have been received when travelling to private accommodation from Norman Manley International Airport; be especially vigilant when travelling from the airport to your accommodation.

2. Europe

19/02/15 – Italy – On heightened alert following Isis video which warned that Libya could be used as a springboard for attacks in the country. There is an increased security presence outside Rome's American embassy on Via Veneto and the Libyan embassy on Via Nomentana, as a special security taskforce plans the capital's response to recent threats from Islamic State (ISIS) militants in Libya.

3. Asia & Oceania

12/02/15 – Bangladesh - Due to the current unrest, the Bangladesh government has decided not to operate any inter-district passenger buses after 9 pm across Bangladesh until further notice.

4. North Africa and the Middle East

11.02.15 – Yemen - Diplomatic Staff have been withdrawn from the British Embassy in Sana'a on security grounds. The security situation in Yemen has continued to deteriorate over recent days and as a result it was judged that the British Embassy staff and premises are at increased risk. Therefore the decision was made to withdraw diplomatic staff and temporarily suspend the operations of the British Embassy in Sana'a. The Ambassador and diplomatic staff have left Yemen and will return to the UK.

11.02.15 – Yemen - On February 11th, 2015, due to the deteriorating security situation in Sanaa, the US Department of State suspended embassy operations and U.S. Embassy Sanaa. American staff was relocated out of the country. The Department urges U.S. citizens to defer travel to Yemen and those U.S. citizens currently living in Yemen to depart.

26/02/15 – Egypt – a 'state of emergency' has been declared and a curfew in place along the coast between Al-Arish and Rafah; There were terrorist attacks on 24th October 2014 and the 29th January 2015 around Sheikh Zuwayed, Rafah, and al-Arish, that killed over 30 soldiers on each occasion. A state of emergency has been declared and a curfew is in place between 7pm and 6am along the coast between al-Arish and Rafah extending around 40km inland. There are regular bomb attacks against government buildings, security forces and energy infrastructure. The al-Arish area has seen many attacks, but the whole of the North Sinai region is at risk. Foreign workers have been taken hostage by Bedouin tribesmen. Security authorities often close the Suez-Taba road.

5. Africa:

8/02/15 – Nigeria - The decision by the Nigerian Electoral Commission to postpone the presidential elections by six weeks, is a cause for concern. Nigeria has re-scheduled the general and gubernatorial elections to March 28th and April 11th, 2015, respectively. The upcoming elections are closely contested historical evidence shows that there can be an up scaling of violence during such times, especially after results have been announced.

20/02/15 – Somalia - terrorist incidents, including an explosion at the Central Hotel in Mogadishu on 20 February, killing at least 25 people

11/02/15 – Niger - Niger has declared a 15-day state of emergency in the border region of Diffa after a spate of attacks by Nigerian militant Islamist group Boko Haram. The declaration gives troops in Diffa new powers to search homes without a warrant and imposes a curfew. The state of emergency in Diffa gives the region's governor powers to introduce new restrictions without passing any laws. The curfew will force Diffa residents to stay indoors between 20:00 and 06:00 local time (19:00 and 05:00 GMT).

6. South America and Antarctica

Nothing to report.

Health Advisory

High Alert

Ebola in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone – see previous reports for information on how to prevent the spread of Ebola.

Ebola deaths

Figures up to 28th February 2015

9,729

Deaths - probable, confirmed and suspected

(Includes one in the US and six in Mali)

- 4,057 Liberia
- 3,530 Sierra Leone
- 2,127 Guinea
- 8 Nigeria

(Source: WHO)

Medium Alert

MERS in the Arabian Peninsula - Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) is viral respiratory illness that is new to humans. It was first reported in Saudi Arabia in 2012 and has since spread to several other countries, including the United States. Most people infected with MERS-CoV developed severe acute respiratory illness, including fever, cough, and shortness of breath. Many of them have died.

Low Alert

Chikungunya In South America

As of February 23rd, 2015, the following South American countries have reported cases of chikungunya:

- Bolivia
- Brazil
- Colombia
- Ecuador
- French Guiana
- Guyana
- Paraguay
- Suriname
- Venezuela

Prevent mosquito bites:

- Cover exposed skin by wearing long-sleeved shirts, long pants, and hats.
- Use an appropriate insect repellent as directed.
- Higher percentages of active ingredient provide longer protection. Use products with the following active ingredients: DEET
- Picaridin (also known as KBR 3023, Bayrepel, and icaridin products containing picaridin Oil of lemon eucalyptus (OLE) or PMD (Products containing OLE include Repel and Off! Botanicals)
- IR3535
- Always follow product directions and reapply as directed:
- If you are also using sunscreen, apply sunscreen first and insect repellent second.
- Follow package directions when applying repellent on children. Avoid applying repellent to their hands, eyes, and mouth.
- Treated clothing remains protective after multiple washings. See the product information to find out how long the protection will last.

- If treating items yourself, follow the product instructions carefully.
- Do not use permethrin directly on skin.
- Use permethrin-treated clothing and gear (such as boots, pants, socks, and tents). You can buy pre-treated clothing and gear or treat them yourself:
- Stay and sleep in screened or air conditioned rooms.
- Use a bed net if the area where you are sleeping is exposed to the outdoors.

Measles in the Philippines

Since January 20th 2015 the WHO have recorded 58,010 suspected cases of measles, including 21,420 confirmed cases and 110 deaths in the Philippines during 2014. Most of these cases were among unvaccinated people. It is recommended that visitors to the Philippines are vaccinated against measles.

Measles in Vietnam

As of December 20th 2015, the WHO have recorded 17,267 suspected measles cases, including 5,568 confirmed cases and 2 measles deaths, were reported in Vietnam. Again, travellers to Vietnam are advised to get vaccinated against the disease.

Cholera in Cuba, Dominican Republic and Mexico

Cuban health authorities have reported more than 700 cases of cholera, including 3 deaths, since July 2012. The outbreak is ongoing, and cases have been reported from the provinces of Artemisa, Camaguey, Granma, Guantanamo, Havana, and Santiago de Cuba. Cases have been recorded from visitors returning from Cuba.

Similarly, large numbers of cases have been recorded in both the Dominican Republic and Mexico and cases are ongoing.

Protection from Cholera:

1) Drink and use safe water:

- Bottled water with unbroken seals and canned or bottled carbonated beverages are safe to drink.
- Use safe water to brush your teeth, wash and prepare food, and make ice.
- Clean food preparation areas and kitchenware with soap and safe water and let dry completely before reuse.

Piped water sources, drinks sold in cups or bags, or ice may not be safe. All drinking water and water used to make ice should be boiled or treated with chlorine.

To be sure water is safe to drink and use:

- Boil it or treat it with water purification tablets, a chlorine product, or household bleach.
- Bring your water to a complete boil for at least 1 minute.
- To treat your water, use water purification tablets—brought with you from the United States or a locally available treatment product—and follow the instructions.
- If a chlorine treatment product is not available, you can treat your water with household bleach. Add 8 drops of household bleach for every 1 gallon of water (or 2 drops of household bleach for every 1 liter of water) and wait 30 minutes before drinking.

2.) Wash your hands often with soap and safe water:

- Before eating or preparing food.
- Before feeding your children.
- After using the bathroom.
- After changing diapers.
- After taking care of someone ill with diarrhea.
- **If no soap is available, use an alcohol-based hand sanitizer containing at least 60% alcohol.**

3) Use toilets; do not defecate in any body of water:

- Use toilets, latrines, or other sanitation systems, such as chemical toilets, to dispose of feces.
- Wash hands with soap and clean water after using the bathroom.
- Clean toilets and surfaces contaminated with feces by using a solution of 1 part household bleach to 9 parts water.

4) Cook food well (especially seafood), keep it covered, eat it hot, and peel fruits and vegetables:

- Be sure to cook shellfish (such as crabs and crayfish) until they are very hot all the way through.
- Do not bring perishable seafood back to the United States.

Avoid raw foods other than fruits and vegetables you have peeled yourself.

- **5) Clean up safely—in the kitchen and in places where the family bathes and washes clothes:**

- Wash yourself, your children, diapers, and clothes at least 100 feet away from drinking water sources
- Always store your treated water in a clean, covered container.



Anti-Piracy Measures/Best Management Practices

Allmode strongly recommend that all vessels transiting the HRA implement BMP4. The three fundamental requirements of BMP4 are:

- 1. Register at MSCHOA:** Ensure that a 'Vessel Movement Registration Form' has been submitted to MSCHOA prior to entering the HRA.
- 2. Report to UKMTO:** On entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area – an area bound by Suez to the North, 10S and 78E – ensure that a UKMTO 'Vessel Positioning Reporting Form – Initial Report' is sent. Vessels are strongly encouraged to report daily to the UKMTO by email at 0800 GMT whilst operating in the HRA.
- 3. Implement Ship Protection Measures (SPM):** The measures described in BMP4 are the most basic that are likely to be effective. If pirates are unable to board a ship they cannot hijack it. Allmode is able to provide advice on request.
- 4. Enhanced Watch keeping:** Additional, briefed lookouts should be used for each watch, and careful Radar Watch should be maintained. A sufficient number of anti-glare binoculars should be available for the enhanced Bridge Team. Masters should consider a shorter rotation of the watch period in order to maximise alertness of the lookouts, and the utilisation of night vision optics.



Attack Types

Definitions of attack type vary between the different piracy reporting centres. The definitions used in this report are as follows:

- **Hijacked Vessel:** Vessel which pirates board and take control of against the will of the crew.
- **Boarded and Robbed:** Vessel which pirates board and rob, but do not take control of.
- **Fired Upon:** Vessel which is fired upon by pirates using small arms or RPG.
- **Attempted Boarding:** Vessel which pirates have attempted to board, or have boarded but failed to secure.

- **Suspicious Approach:** Suspicious small craft, e.g.: a craft containing non-fishing equipment such as ladders, which makes a definite course alteration towards the vessel.
- **Suspicious Activity:** Small craft behaving suspiciously such as sailing on the same course or speed for an uncommon period and distance, not in keeping with normal fishing trends.
- **Disruption:** Any incident where a pirate vessel at sea is prevented from conducting piracy operations due to direct engagement or interdiction by coalition forces.
- **Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC):** The IRTC was established in the Gulf of Aden in February 2009. This enables Vessels to transit the corridor, if necessary in arranged convoys, and the IRTC is patrolled and supported by a strong naval presence.
- **Pirate Action Group:** Any group engaging in pirate activity consisting of a mother-ship accompanied by at least one attack skiff, or two or more attack skiffs operating independently.
- **Pirated Vessel:** A vessel captured by pirates which will be used to demand a ransom. Pirates remain on board the vessel in full control of both the vessel and the crew, can also be used as a mother-ship



Night Vision Devices

Visual acuity from night vision devices provides a vast improvement over human night vision. However, it is far from perfect. As with direct sight, higher levels of acuity are associated with closer, slower targets. The visual acuity offered by image intensification rapidly diminishes for objects over 400 feet away. This distance is further reduced, the faster the target is moving. A number of environmental factors can also reduce the acuity of image intensification systems. Rain, clouds, mist, dust, smoke and fog can all affect performance.



About Allmode

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SERVICES

Allmode Limited provides a range of Risk Management and Security services to global, private clients. Due to the diversity of our client base we have consultants from a wide range of backgrounds and professions heightening our knowledge and experience within the security industry which we serve.

Based within the UK, our head office is located in Ramsey on the Isle of Man and our ability to operate globally is enhanced through our network of in-country professionals, contacts and resources and specifically through strategically located offices in Dubai and Singapore.

Our work ethos is focused around professionalism, reliability, time and cost. Our ability to recognise what is important and listen to our clients combined with our extensive networks, wide spectrum of services and worldwide capability ensures that we deliver effectively on all four. Our SAFE concept encompasses a number of services that can be tailored to fit a specific vessel or clients' needs.

The first step in an effective security management plan is to understand the specific and unique threats and risks to the asset and furthermore to the principal. Our consultants are all former Forces personnel and have specialist security knowledge including ISPS, IMO, Close Protection, Security Management, Security Auditing, Intelligence Gathering and Maritime Security. Using a threat and risk assessment analysis, we are able to help our clients understand their vulnerability and therefore tailor SAFE to suit your individual needs and requirements

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